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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CALEEN LOWE JONES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860250 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in allowing an expert 
witness to testify as to his opinion that a combination of 
physical injuries, as defined in 76-5-109(1)(b), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, together with an environmental set-
ting created a substantial risk of death as used in 76-5-109(1)-
(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to convict the 
Defendant of child abuse, a second degree felony, or should the 
conviction have been for child abuse, a class A misdemeanor? 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Child Abuse, a 
Second Degree Felony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 27, 1986, the Appellant was convicted by 
jury verdict after a four and one-half day trial in Iron County. 
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The Appellant requested the preparation of a Pre-Sentence 
Report and on April 1, 198 6, she appeared before the Court and 
was sentenced to a term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of her conviction and 
release from incarceration, or, in the alternative, a reduction 
in the severity of the offense from a Second Degree Felony to a 
Class A Misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant/Appellant, Caleen Lowe Jones, together 
with her sixteen month old son, Jacob Hart Jones, moved into a 
trailer house located in the Cedar Valley area of Iron County 
some seven miles northwest of Cedar City in late April of 1985 
(Transcript, Vol. 4, 56-57). The other occupant of the house 
trailer was James Chad Anderson, a Co-Defendant in the action 
who, during the trial, pled guilty to the third degree felony 
offense of child abuse (T.169-171) and was later sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison for a period of time not to exceed five years, 
with the recommendation of the Court to the Board of Corrections 
that Mr. Anderson serve the entire five years. On May 19, 1985, 
while the Defendant/Appellant, Caleen Lowe Jones, was at the 
Valley View Medical Center in Cedar City having a broken hand 
cast by emergency room personnel (T. Vol. 4, 62), James Chad 
Anderson had the physical care and supervision of Jacob Hart 
Jones(T.170). At that time, Jacob Hart Jones was burned on his 
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lower left leg by contacting the hot door of a clothes dryer 
located in the bathroom area of the home (T.97, 170). It is this 
burn together with an injury to the bridge of the nose to which 
the Defendant, James Chad Anderson, entered his plea of guilty 
(T.170). The burn was a large one and second degree in severity 
(T.99) . 
On May 20, 1985, the Defendant/Appellant noticed the 
presence of the burn on her son's leg and took him to the Valley 
View Medical Center where he was treated by nurses and 
Dr. Michael Stultz in the emergency room of the Valley View 
Medical Center (T.96). The nurses testified that the child 
appeared to have little separation anxiety when taken from his 
mother and exhibited stoic behavior when his burn was washed and 
bandaged (T.421-423). This behavior was described by the nurses 
on subsequent visits to the Valley View Medical Center for 
follow-up treatment on May 21, 22, and 2 3rd, though on May 23rd, 
the Co-Defendant James Chad Anderson took the child into the 
hospital (T.427-428, 439-442). During the period of time from 
May 20, 1986, until May 25, 1986, pursuant to the instruction of 
law enforcement officials and the instructions of Mr. Kerry Hedin 
(T.459) of the Division of Family Services, the Defendant/ 
Appellant, Caleen Lowe Jones, resided outside of the trailer 
house that she had shared with James Chad Anderson. During that 
time she and her son lived with a cousin, though they often 
visited in the trailer house occupied by Mr. Anderson (T. Vol. 4, 
74). On May 25, 1985, the Defendant/Appellant, Caleen Lowe 
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Jones, moved back into the trailer house with James Chad Anderson 
(T.80). On May 30, 1985, near midnight, Mrs. Jones and the 
Co-Defendant, James Chad Anderson, rushed Jacob Hart Jones back 
to the emergency room of the Valley View Medical Center. At the 
time that Jacob Hart Jones was taken to the Valley View Medical 
Center emergency room, he was in full cardio-pulmonary arrest 
(T. 394-395). The personnel at the medical center were able to 
resuscitate (T.201) Jacob Hart Jones and he was thereafter 
transferred to Primary Childrens Hospital in Salt Lake City where 
he died on June 1, 1985, the doctors having determined that the 
child was brain-dead (T.274). Certain additional injuries were 
observed when the child returned to Valley View Medical Center on 
May 31, 1985, which were not observed when the child was seen on 
May 20, 1985. 
The office of the State Medical Examiner determined 
that the child died of natural causes, noting the presence of 
Neisseria meningitis bacteria in the blood stream, together with 
pancreatitis and pneumonia (T.349-350). Witnesses offered by the 
State expressed their opinion that the child died from severe 
edema of the brain (T.350). The testimony of the Co-Defendant 
James Chad Anderson was that on the night of May 30, 198 5, he put 
the child to bed and when checking on the child some half an hour 
to forty five minutes later found that Jacob Hart Jones had 
stopped breathing. 
At the trial of the case, Dr. William Martin Palmer of 
the Primary Childrens Medical Center testified that none of the 
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injuries found on Jacob Hart Jones (ranging from the large burn 
inflicted by the dryer to small burns on the fingers and includ-
ing various bruises and excoriations on the soles of the feet) 
would create a permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of a function of a body member, limb or organ, or 
substantial risk of death (T.318-320). However, Dr. Palmer was 
allowed to testify, over the objection of counsel, that the 
combination of the physical injuries noted on Jacob Hart Jones, 
together with other signs of behavior noted by the hospital 
personnel of the Valley View Medical Center, created for Jacob 
Hart Jones an environment in which he was subjected to a substan-
tial risk of death (T.358-361). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred in allowing an expert 
witness to testify as to his opinion that a combination of 
physical injuries as defined in 76-5-109(1) (b), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, together with an environmental setting 
created a substantial risk of death as used in 76-5-109 (1) (c) , 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
2. There was insufficient evidence to convict the 
Defendant of child abuse, a second degree felony, and therefore 
any conviction should have been for no more than a class A 
misdemeanor of child abuse. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AN EXPERT WITNESS TO 
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TESTIFY AS TO HIS OPINION THAT A COMBINATION OF PHYSICAL INJURIES 
AS DEFINED IN 76-5-109(1)(b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, TOGETHER WITH AN ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING CREATED A 
SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF DEATH AS USED IN 76-5-109 (1) (c) , Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The central issue on appeal in this particular case is 
the construction of the statute 76-5-109, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. That specific statute is set forth as follows: 
76-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who 
is 17 years of age or less; 
(b) "Physical injury" means 
impairment of the physical condition includ-
ing, but not limited to, any contusion of the 
skin, laceration, failure to thrive, malnu-
trition, burn, fracture of any bone, subdural 
hematoma, injury to any internal organ, any 
injury causing bleeding, or any physical 
condition which imperils a child's health or 
welfare; 
(c) "Serious physical injury" means 
any physical injury which creates a permanent 
disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment 
of a function of a body member, limb or 
organ, or substantial risk of death. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child 
serious physical injury or, having the care 
and custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict serious physicl injury 
upon a child is guilty of an offense as 
follows: 
(a) If done intentionally or 
knowingly, the offense is a felony of the 
second degree; 
(b) If done recklessly, the offense 
is a felony of the third degree; 
(c) If done with criminal negli-
gence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child 
physical injury or, having the care and 
custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict physical injury upon a 
child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
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(a) If done intentionally or 
knowingly, the offense is a class A misde-
meanor; 
(b) If done recklessly, the offense 
is a class B misdemeanor; 
(c) If done with criminal negli-
gence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) Criminal actions under this section 
may be prosecuted in the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, where the existence of the 
offense is discovered, where the victim 
resides, or where the defendant resides. 
The State's theory in this case is best set out on page 
3 58 of the Trial Transcript where the prosecutor stated: 
Q. Do you have an opinion, then, as to 
whether or not — well, let me back up. 
In addition that we are also considering 
the original physical injuries, burns and 
bruises to Jacob Hart Jones, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. All those factors combined, do 
you have an opinion, then, as to whether or 
not those injuries, taken in conjunction with 
the other circumstances I just discussed, 
presented a risk, a substantial risk of death 
to the child or person of Jacob Hart Jones? 
A timely objection was made to the form of this 
question and to the State's theory in presenting this evidence to 
the jury by using a combination of factors to define certain 
injuries as creating a "substantial risk of death" which is a 
portion of the definition of "serious physical injury" in 
76-5-109(1)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
It is the contention of the defense that the injuries 
observed on the person of Jacob Hart Jones, which consisted of 
bruises, lacerations, and burns, did not either individually or 
together create a "substantial risk of death" as defined in the 
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statute. 
The rules of statutory construction in criminal cases 
are very clear. 76-1-106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
states: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be 
strictly construed shall not apply to this 
code, any of its provision, or any offense 
defined by the laws of this state. All 
provisions of this code and offenses defined 
by the laws of this state shall be construed 
according to the fair import of their terms 
to promote justice and to effect the objects 
of the law and general purposes of section 
76-1-104. 
The above statute was followed and approved in State v. 
Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah 1974). In that case Justice 
Ellett wrote, "Even though the rule of strict construction of a 
criminal statute is not the law in Utah, there is nothing to 
construe where there is no ambiguity in the statute." There is 
no ambiguity in subsection (c) of 76-5-109(1), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended. The statute classifies a number of 
additional factors which enhance "physical injuries" to reach the 
status of "serious physical injury." There can be no construc-
tion of the definition of "serious physical injury" that would 
allow a combining of simple "physical injuries" in order to 
create a "substantial risk of death." 
It would seem that the State's theory in this case 
requires additional statutory language before it can be presented 
to a jury as it was in this trial. Under the State's theory, 
"serious physical injury" would have to be defined as "any 
physical injury or combination of injuries which creates a 
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permanent disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of a 
function of a body member, limb or organ, or substantial risk of 
death". The statute at the present time does not have the 
language which is underlined above. However, at the trial 
of this case the State was permitted to proceed as though such 
language were present and Dr. Palmer was allowed to testify that 
a combination of injuries and other conditions, taken together, 
created for Jacob Hart Jones a substantial risk of death (T.358-
361) . 
II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFEN-
DANT OF CHILD ABUSE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND THEREFORE ANY 
CONVICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOR NO MORE THAN A CLASS A MISDE-
MEANOR OF CHILD ABUSE. 
In an evaluation of the jury verdict in this case, it 
appears that the jury determined that the mental state of 
the Defendant was one of conduct done knowingly and intention-
ally. However, such a mental state, when coupled with injuries 
which are defined under 76-5-109(1)(b), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, as "physical injuries" rather than "serious 
physical injuries" can support only a conviction of a class A 
misdemeanor. The testimony of the witnesses throughout the trial 
was that the contusions, lacerations, and burns, did not fall 
under the category of "serious physical injury" in that none of 
these injuries created a "permanent disfigurement; protracted 
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loss or impairment of a function of a body member, limb or 
organ, or substantial risk of death". Because of the nature of 
the injuries sustained by Jacob Hart Jones, the record does not 
support a conviction of any level of offense higher than a 
class A misdemeanor of child abuse wherein "physical injury" was 
inflicted intentionally or knowingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court allowed the State to continue 
with a line of questioning which elicited evidence beyond the 
scope of the statute, the jury was presented with a theory of 
criminal activity not found within the statute in question. 
Since the conduct presented to the jury is not defined as the 
more serious of the two crimes involved, the Defendant cannot be 
convicted of the second degree felony offense of child abuse. 
The only offense which the Defendant may be convicted of is the 
class A misdemeanor of child abuse and for that reason the 
conviction must be overturned. 
Respectfully submitted this 33st day of October, 1986. 
^^TAMES L. S 
ts' Attorney for Appellant 
110 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-3772 
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of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to Mr. Earl 
Dorious, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this 31st day of October, 1986, first class 
postage prepaid. 
JJfflfcS L. SHUMATE 
-11-
